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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimizing the revenue a
web publisher gets through real-time bidding (i.e. from ads sold in
real-time auctions) and direct (i.e. from ads sold through contracts
agreed in advance). We consider a setting where the publisher is
able to bid in the real-time bidding auction for each impression.
If it wins the auction, it chooses a direct campaign to deliver and
displays the corresponding ad.
This paper presents an algorithm to build an optimal strategy
for the publisher to deliver its direct campaigns while maximizing
its real-time bidding revenue. The optimal strategy gives a formula
to determine the publisher bid as well as a way to choose the direct
campaign being delivered if the publisher bidder wins the auction,
depending on the impression characteristics.
The optimal strategy can be estimated on past auctions data.
The algorithm scales with the number of campaigns and the size
of the dataset. This is a very important feature, as in practice a
publisher may have thousands of active direct campaigns at the
same time and would like to estimate an optimal strategy on billions
of auctions.
The algorithm is a key component of a system which is being
developed, and which will be deployed on thousands of web pub-
lishers worldwide, helping them to serve efficiently billions of ads
a day to hundreds of millions of visitors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Mathematics of computing → Probability and statistics;
Continuous optimization; • Applied computing → Online
auctions;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Web publishers use different channels to sell their ads. We consider
in this paper two channels: RTB (real-time bidding) and Direct. In
RTB, the publisher sells ads through an ad exchange where buyers
compete in auctions happening in real time. In Direct, the ads are
sold through direct campaigns.
A direct campaign is a contract in which a publisher commits to
deliver a specified number of ads to an advertiser while ensuring
that some KPIs are met (for example the publisher may guarantee a
minimum number of clicks to the advertiser). Should the publisher
not deliver the impressions as defined in the contract, it pays a
penalty to the advertiser.
A natural way for a publisher to allocate impressions between
the two channels is to bid in the RTB auction for every impression:
if it wins the auction, the publisher chooses a direct campaign to
sell the impression, otherwise the impression is sold in the RTB
market.
The first section gives a review of past work related to this topic.
The second section states the optimization problem to solve. The
two following sections derive optimality conditions and present an
algorithm to build an optimal delivering strategy. The last section
presents the results of experiments realized on a real RTB auctions
dataset.
2 RELATEDWORK
The problem of maximizing a web publisher advertising revenue
is much studied in the literature. Because of the complexity of
the online advertising ecosystem, and because the publishers sell
their ads through different channels, this problem leads to diverse
approaches.
[12], [15] and [3] consider a publisher selling its ads through
RTB only, and define strategies for the publisher to set appropriate
reserve prices in each auction to optimize its RTB revenue. In [12],
the reserve prices are set in a static way (i.e. an optimal reserve
price is estimated on a large set of auctions), whereas [15] and
[3] define methodologies to set dynamic reserve prices which are
predicted in real time before an auction happens.
[11] and [10] study the optimal delivery of a budget across time
in the RTB market. This problem known as budget pacing has been
much studied and presents strong similarities with the problem of
delivering a direct campaign. In both articles, the bids are updated
online to optimize the budget delivery.
[13] and [2] focus onDirect revenuemaximization. They consider
that the impressions can be sold in direct campaigns only, and define
strategies to allocate optimally a set of impressions between all
campaigns in order tomaximize the publisher revenue (i.e. minimize
the penalty the publisher pays if some campaigns are not delivered
as agreed in the contract). [13] formulates this problem as a dynamic
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programming problem, and [2] proposes an efficient algorithm to
allocate near-optimally the impresions between the campaigns.
[7], [6], [5] and [1] study the joint optimization of the publisher
revenue coming from RTB and Direct. They consider a setting simi-
lar to our setting, in which the publisher bids in auctions to compete
with RTB bidders.
In [7], the quality of a direct campaign delivery is represented
by a utility function, and the quality of each impression is linked
directly to its price in the RTB market, whereas we characterize a
campaign delivery by some KPIs.
The model used in [6] and [5] is based on the modeling of the
supply and the demand on an aggregated level, while we analyze
data auction per auction without needing to model the supply and
demand.
In [1], a campaign is defined by a fixed number of impressions
which is supposed to be delivered exactly, and a per-impression
quality. The algorithm aims to maximize a weighted sum of the
RTB revenue and of the direct campaigns qualities. The main differ-
ence with our approach is that the campaigns are supposed to be
completely delivered. In our approach, we enable under-delivery
of a campaign if it brings a higher revenue to the publisher, which
makes the problem more complex. Also, the approach described
in [1] may be hard to scale due to the allocation plan used to al-
locate similar campaigns. We solve this issue by regularizing the
optimization problem.
Finally, [14] and [4] present stochastic models for supply and
demand, and link the problem of Direct revenue maximization with
the problem of option pricing in finance.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we introduce the two channels used by the publisher
to sell its ads: RTB and Direct. Then, we derive the global revenue
the publisher gets from both channels, and formulate the revenue
optimization problem.
All random variables are defined with respect to the filtration
Ft0 , which is the filtration representing the information available
at time t = t0, i.e. before the first auction happens.
3.1 RTBmarket
We represent the RTB market as a set of N time-ordered auctions
happening at times t1, . . . , tn , . . . , tN . This approach is determin-
istic in that we do not model the uncertainty in the auctions to
come.
In auction n, a set of RTB buyers compete to buy the ad slot
and display their ad. We note respectively Bn and Cn the random
variables corresponding to the highest bid and the second highest
bid in the auction (possibly 0 if there are not enough buyers bidding
in the auction).
We note Fn (.) (respectively fn (.)) the marginal cumulative distri-
bution function of Bn (respectively its probability density function).
3.2 Direct campaigns
TheDirect channel is represented byK direct campaigns C1, . . . ,CK
booked by the publisher at time t = t0. We assume that the set of
campaigns is static, i.e. existing campaigns can not be cancelled,
and no new campaign is booked.
Each campaign is defined by a contractual revenue, which is the
revenue the publisher is paid to deliver the campaign, a set of goals
and a penalty function giving the penalty the publisher has to pay
when these goals are not met.
3.2.1 Contractual revenue of the campaign. We note πk the rev-
enue the publisher gets to deliver the campaign. It is worth noting
that the publisher strategy to deliver the campaign does not depend
on this amount, which is contractual and fixed before the campaign
is delivered.
3.2.2 Goals of the campaign. Let pk be the number of goals
for campaign Ck . Each goal i is defined by a targeting Tk,i and a
volume дk,i to be delivered in the targeting Tk,i .
The targeting Tk,i is defined in each auction n by the Bernoulli
variable Xn,k,i equal to 1 if impression n is eligible for the target-
ing, and 0 otherwise. Let θn,k,i be the parameter of the Bernoulli
variable Xn,k,i , which is supposed to be known before the auction
happens.
A deterministic targeting corresponds to the case where we
know certainly if the ad will be in the targeting when bidding in
the auction, and we have in this case θn,k,i = 1 or θn,k,i = 0. For
example, targeting a website or an ad placement is a deterministic
targeting.
A stochastic targeting corresponds to the case where we do not
know if the ad will be in the targeting before the auction happens.
In this case, θn,k,i is an estimation of the probability for the ad to
be in the targeting. For example, targeting only clicked impressions
is a stochastic targeting, as we do not know if the ad will be clicked
or not before it has been displayed.
3.2.3 Penalty function. We introduce the variablesδk,1, . . . ,δk,pk ,
where δk,i corresponds to the difference between the goal дk,i and
the volume delivered effectively on the targeting Tk,i .
For campaign Ck , the penalty function Lk (δk,1, . . . ,δk,pk ) gives
the penalty the publisher has to pay when it fails to deliver the
goals. At the end of the campaign, this penalty should be deduced
from the contractual revenue of the campaign to get the revenue
the publisher got from the campaign.
A typical penalty functionwould beLk (δk,1, . . . ,δk,pk ) =
∑pk
i=1 li×
max(δk,i , 0), corresponding to the case where the publisher pays li
for each non-delivered impression on targeting Tk,i .
3.3 Auction mechanics
Let an and Rn (an ) be respectively the publisher bid and the RTB
revenue in auctionn. We note also rn (an ) = E[Rn (an )] the expected
RTB revenue. The auction mechanics is the following:
• If an ≥ Bn , the publisher bidder wins the auction and the
publisher chooses a direct campaign to display. We note Qn
the multinoulli variable with parameters (qn,1, . . . ,qn,K )
such that campaign Ck is chosen with probability qn,k . The
RTB revenue for this auction is Rn (an ) = 0
• If an < Bn , the ad is sold in the RTB market. When the auc-
tion mechanism is a second-price auction, which is the most
usual mechanism, we have Rn (an ) = 1an<Bn max(Cn ,an )1.
1This outcome corresponds to the case where no reserve price is set in the auction.
The case where a reserve price is set is handled by replacing Cn by the maximum
value between the second highest bid and the reserve price.
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When the auction is a first-price auction, we have Rn (an ) =
1an<BnBn
3.4 Volumes delivered on direct campaigns
Let Vk,i be the volume delivered on the targeting Tk,i after the N
auctions have occured. It can be written:
Vk,i =
N∑
n=1
1an ≥Bn1Qn=kXn,k,i
We note vk,i = E[Vk,i ]. We assume that for each (k, i), the
random variables Bn , Qn and Xn,k,i are independent, which gives:
vk,i =
N∑
n=1
Fn (an )qn,kθn,k,i
Note that the independence hypothesis between Bn , Qn and
Xn,k,i is not a strong hypothesis: indeed, as these random variables
are specific to auction n, they include already all the information
we may know about the auction.
3.5 Publisher revenue
Let Y be the total publisher revenue coming both from RTB and
Direct, and let y = E[Y ] be its expected value. It depends on the
publisher bids (an )Nn=1, and on the parameters (qn,1, . . . ,qn,K )Nn=1
used to select the winning campaign when the publisher bidder
wins the auction.
It writes:
Y
(
(an )Nn=1, (qn,1, . . . ,qn,K )Nn=1
)
=
N∑
n=1
Rn (an ) +
K∑
k=1
(
πk − Lk (Vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,Vk,pk − дk,pk )
) (1)
To simplify the expression of the expected revenue, we make the
following approximation:
E[Lk (Vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,Vk,pk − дk,pk )] ≈
Lk (E[Vk,1 − дk,1], . . . ,E[Vk,pk − дk,pk ])
(2)
This approximation tends to be well verified when the volumes
delivered on all targetings are large.
The expected publisher revenue is finally written:
y
(
(an )Nn=1, (qn,1, . . . ,qn,K )Nn=1
)
=
N∑
n=1
rn (an ) +
K∑
k=1
(
πk − Lk (vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,vk,pk − дk,pk )
) (3)
Note that the publisher bidder impacts the RTB revenue in two
ways: by removing impressions from the RTB channel to deliver
direct campaigns, and by modifying the RTB closing price (for
example when the publisher bid an acts as a second price in a
second-price auction mechanism).
3.6 Optimization problem statement
In this section, we note (an ) the sequence of all an (n = 1, . . . ,N ),
(qn,k ) the sequence of all qn,k (n = 1, . . . ,N and k = 1, . . . ,K ), and
(vk,i ) the sequence of all vk,i (k = 1, . . . ,K and i = 1, . . . ,pk ).
The optimization problem is written the following way:
max
(an ),(qn,k ),(vk,i )
N∑
n=1
rn (an )+
K∑
k=1
(
πk − Lk (vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,vk,pk − дk,pk )
) (4)
s.t 
∀k, i vk,i =
N∑
n=1
Fn (an )qn,kθn,k,i
∀n
K∑
k=1
qn,k = 1
∀n,k qn,k ≥ 0
(5)
Note that the variables (vk,i ), which represent the volumes de-
livered on all targetings, are considered to be variables to optimize
whereas they derive directly from (an ) and (qn,k ). This relation
is introduced as an equality constraint. Stating the problem this
way makes its analysis and the presentation of the optimization
algorithm much simpler.
4 OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
This section writes the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the opti-
mization problem stated in the previous section for two kinds of
penalty functions: differentiable functions and rectified linear func-
tions (which are not differentiable everywhere but which are widely
used in practice). The lagrangian of the problem and the complete
derivation of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given in the
appendix.
4.1 Optimality conditions when the penalty
functions are differentiable
We introduce the score of campaign Ck in auction n, defined by:
cn,k = −
pk∑
i=1
θn,k,i
∂Lk
∂vk,i
(vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,vk,pk − дk,pk )
4.1.1 Optimality condition on qn,k . The optimality condition
on qn,k writes:
qn,k > 0⇒ k ∈ argmax
k
cn,k
In the particular case where there is one unique campaign Ck0
maximizing cn,k , we haveqn,k = 1 ifk = k0 andqn,k = 0 otherwise.
If several campaigns maximize cn,k , the optimality conditions do
not give an easy way to determine the corresponding qn,k .
4.1.2 Optimality condition on an . The optimality condition on
an writes:
r ′n (an ) + fn (an )max
k
cn,k = 0
It is worth noting that the expected revenue from auction n,
should it bring c if it is sold in a direct campaign, writes rn (a) +
Fn (a)c . Therefore, an is the bid maximizing the expected revenue
from auctionn if it bringsmaxk cn,k if it is sold in a direct campaign.
The appendix gives a detailed analysis of the existence of an
verifying this condition.
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4.2 Optimality conditions when some penalty
functions are rectified linear functions
We assume in this section that the penalty function for campaign
Ck writes Lk (vk,1, . . . ,vk,pk ) =
∑pk
i=1 li max(дk,i − vk,i , 0). This
kind of penalty function is widely used in practice but is not differ-
entiable.
The optimality conditions are similar to the ones obtained when
the penalty functions are differentiable, but where the score of
campaign Ck is written the following way:
cn,k =
pk∑
i=1
θn,k,iκk,i with

κk,i = li if vk,i < дk,i
κk,i ∈ [0, li ] if vk,i = дk,i
κk,i = 0 if vk,i > дk,i
5 OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM
This section proposes an algorithm to estimate an optimal strategy
(i.e. (an ) and (qn,k )) on a RTB auctions dataset. We assume that the
dataset is processed in batches of auctions. In practice, the dataset
is shuffled before processing it to ensure the batches are statistically
equivalent.
5.1 Description of the algorithm when the
penalty functions are differentiable
When the penalty functions are differentiable, the algorithm esti-
mates the optimal volumes delivered on all targetings, which are
the only variables needed to estimate in each auction n the scores
of the campaigns and then the optimal an and qn,k .
We note v(j)k,i the estimation of these volumes after having pro-
cessed j batches. A naive initialization of the algorithm is v(0)k,i = 0,
but a better initialization can accelerate significantly the conver-
gence of the algorithm. For example, it may be relevant to initialize
the algorithm with v(0)k,i = дk,i .
The j-th batch of auctions is processed with two steps.
5.1.1 Step 1: loop on the batch and apply the strategy determined
using v(j−1)k,i . In this section, we note (c
(j−1)
n,k ) the scores of the cam-
paigns in auction n computed when the volumes delivered on all
targetings are (v(j−1)k,i ).
We note ân and q̂n,k the publisher bid and the campaigns proba-
bilities applied in auctionn. They are determined with the following
equations, which are obtained by writing the optimality conditions
when the volumes are given by v(j−1)k,i :
q̂n,k > 0⇒ k ∈ argmax
k
c
(j−1)
n,k
r ′n (ân ) + fn (ân )max
k
c
(j−1)
n,k = 0
(6)
When argmaxk c
(j−1)
n,k contains one element only, it is selected,
otherwise a campaign is randomly chosen among those with the
maximum score. We note v̂k,i the volumes delivered on all cam-
paigns when this strategy is applied on the j-th batch.
5.1.2 Step 2: determine v(j)k,i . We introduce the ratio of the num-
ber of auctions in one batch to the number of auctions in the dataset,
noted ρ. We introduce also the learning rate of the algorithm α j .
v
(j)
k,i is determined with:
∀k, i : v(j)k,i = v
(j−1)
k,i + α j (v̂k,i − ρ ×v
(j−1)
k,i )
This updatemethodology is based on the fact that at the optimum,
the volume delivered on a targeting on one batch of data v̂k,i is
equal in average to ρ ×v(j−1)k,i .
The choice of (α j ) has a major impact on the convergence speed
of the algorithm. If α j is too high, the algorithm may not converge,
whereas a too low value makes the convergence very slow. We use
in practice a decreasing α j , for example α j ∝ 1j .
The size of the batches is an important parameter of the algo-
rithm. In practice, we notice that the smaller the batches, the faster
converges the algorithm, where the convergence speed is defined
as the number of auctions to process to attain a given level of con-
vergence. However, the update step performed for each batch is
computationally expensive as it requires to update the volumes
for all campaigns. In practice, we use batches composed of a few
hundreds of auctions.
5.2 Description of the algorithm when some
penalty functions are rectified linear
functions
We assume in this section that the penalty function for campaign
Ck writes Lk (vk,1, . . . ,vk,pk ) =
∑pk
i=1 li max(дk,i − vk,i , 0). The
score cn,k in auction n writes in this case cn,k =
∑pk
i=1 θn,k,iκk,i .
For this campaign, the algorithm estimates the values of κk,i ,
which are the variables needed to estimate the score of this cam-
paign in each auction n. We define κ(j)k,i the estimate of κk,i after
having processed j batches.
A natural way to initialize the algorithm is κ(0)k,i = 0, which is
consistent with the initialization v(0)k,i = 0. We could also initialize
with κ(0)k,i = li .
Let κ̂k,i be the estimated value of κk,i on the j-th batch. It is
estimated by comparing the volume delivered on the batch and the
volume we expect to be delivered if the goal дk,i is reached:
κ̂k,i =
{
li if v̂k,i < ρ × дk,i
0 otherwise
Then, the update step is similar:
∀i : κ(j)k,i = κ
(j−1)
k,i + α j (κ̂k,i − κ
(j−1)
k,i )
5.3 A regularization of the optimization
problem
The application of the optimal strategy consists in picking in each
auction the campaign with the highest score, where the score is
computed using the volumes (v(j)k,i ) after the algorithm has con-
verged.
Such a choice of the winning campaign may lead to an unwanted
behaviour of the algorithm. For example, let’s consider the case
of two campaigns with identical definitions. At the optimum, the
volumes for these two campaigns should be identical, which means
that in all auctions, both campaigns will be picked with equal prob-
abilities. In practice, the optimal volumes estimated for these two
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campaigns using the algorithm may be slightly different, and in this
case it is easy to see that one of the campaigns will always have a
higher score than the other one, which will consequently never be
picked.
This simple example illustrates that a minor error in the esti-
mation of the optimal volumes of the campaigns may have a large
impact on the estimated optimal strategy.
To overcome this issue, we have written a regularized version of
the optimization problem and derived the corresponding optimality
conditions. The complete derivation is given in the appendix. The
regularized optimality conditions are:
qn,k =
exp(cn,k Fn (an )ρ )∑K
k′=1 exp(cn,k′ Fn (an )ρ )
r ′n (an ) + fn (an )
∑K
k=1 qn,kcn,k = 0
where ρ is the regularization parameter.
It is worth noting that using this regularization in the optimiza-
tion phase may also accelerate the convergence of the optimization
algorithm.
6 EXPERIMENTS ON AN AUCTIONS
DATASET
We have used in this section a real RTB auctions dataset correspond-
ing to one week of video advertising data. We have filtered auctions
which led to an ad (i.e. auctions won by a buyer and for which
a video ad has been delivered effectively). The dataset has been
shuffled before running the optimization algorithm to ensure that
the batches are statistically equivalent.
In each auction, we will use the following informations:
• The impression id, which is a unique identifier of the impres-
sion
• The placement id, which is a unique identifier of the ad slot.
The dataset contains 4 different ad placements, called P1,
P2, P3 and P4
• The highest bid of the auction (which is strictly positive
because we filtered on auctions won by a buyer)
• We know if the impression has been viewed2 or clicked
Two experiments have been performed:
• The first experiment runs the optimization algorithm with a
few campaigns defined manually, and gives an interpretation
of the optimal strategy
• The second experiment runs the optimization algorithmwith
many campaigns and shows that the algorithm scales with
the number of campaigns
We assume that the auction mechanism is a first-price auction
mechanism. This makes the optimality condition on a easier to
solve because it does not need any hypothesis on the highest RTB
bid distribution.
The optimization algorithm is run with batches of size 1000 and
with αt = 1t . The optimality conditions have been regularized with
the temperature parameter ρ = 0.5, both when determining the
optimal strategy and when applying the optimal strategy on the
dataset. The algorithm is initialized with κk,i = 0.
2The IAB viewability measure is used: an ad is considered to be viewed if at least 50%
of its surface has been within the visible area of the browser window during at least 1
second.
We define in this section the adjusted revenue as the RTB rev-
enue reduced by the penalty the publisher has to pay on the direct
campaigns in case of under-delivery. In both experiments, we plot
the adjusted revenue of the publisher when applying the estimated
optimal strategy on the whole dataset, as a function of the number
of batches of size 1000 processed by the algorithm.
6.1 Descriptive analysis of the dataset
The table below gives the main characteristics of the dataset, per
placement and globally.
Nb Imps Avg RTB bid Avg view rate Avg click rate
P1 15.46 mlns 13.15 $CPM 77.0 % 0.13 %
P2 5.56 mlns 15.36 $CPM 77.9 % 0.23 %
P3 2.43 mlns 15.55 $CPM 59.7 % 2.03 %
P4 0.14 mlns 25.37 $CPM 42.7 % 0.00 %
Total 23.59 mlns 13.99 $CPM 75.3 % 0.35 %
6.2 First experiment: optimization with a few
campaigns
In this section, we define a direct campaign by the following sextu-
plet:
(Nimp ,Nview ,Nclick , limp , lview , lclick )
, where N∗ and l∗ correspond to the goal and to a penalty parameter
associated to the number of impressions, the number of impressions
viewed and the number of impressions clicked. We assume that
all campaigns target all the placements: this hypothesis makes the
results simpler to interpret.
We assume that the penalty functions are rectified linear func-
tions where l∗ is the penalty per non-delivered impression. If vimp ,
vview and vclick are the volumes of impressions, of impressions
viewed and of impressions clicked which have been delivered, the
penalty function writes:
L(vimp ,vview ,vclick ) =
∑
i ∈{imp,view,click }
li ×max(Ni −vi , 0)
This experiment runs the optimization algorithm with the fol-
lowing campaigns:
• 3 impressions campaigns:
– C1 = (3.106, ., ., 5, ., .)
– C2 = (3.106, ., ., 10, ., .)
– C3 = (3.106, ., ., 20, ., .)
• 3 viewability campaigns:
– C4 = (., 2.106, ., ., 5, .)
– C5 = (., 2.106, ., ., 15, .)
– C6 = (., 2.106, ., ., 30, .)
• 3 click campaigns:
– C7 = (., ., 2.103, ., ., 200)
– C8 = (., ., 2.103, ., ., 500)
– C9 = (., ., 2.103, ., ., 1000)
To run the experiment, we have used simple viewability and click
predictors which predict the average viewability rate and click rate
of the placement. These predictors are used before each auction
to compute the scores of the campaigns. Using more advanced
predictors based on more features would clearly improve the results.
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Figure 1: First experiment: average adjusted revenue as a
function of the number of batches processed
Figure 1 plots the adjusted revenue estimated on the whole
dataset as a function of the number of batches processed by the
optimization algorithm. The intialization point corresponds to the
case where no impression is sold in a direct campaign and it is very
far from the optimum in terms of adjusted revenue. The algorithm
converges after having processed a few dozens of batches.
The table below has been built by applying the optimal strategy
estimated after having processed 100 batches of auctions. It gives,
for each campaign, the number of impressions delivered on each
placement, as a percentage of the goal of the campaign. It gives also
the undelivered volume (i.e. the goal less the volume delivered) as
a percentage of the goal of the campaign.
Campaign P1 P2 P3 P4 Undelivered
C1 12% 4% 1% 0% 83%
C2 49% 15% 4% 0% 32%
C3 73% 23% 5% 0% 0%
C4 8% 3% 0% 0% 89%
C5 70% 22% 2% 0% 6%
C6 75% 23% 2% 0% 0%
C7 0% 0% 19% 0% 81%
C8 0% 0% 83% 0% 17%
C9 0% 0% 100% 0% 0%
We see that the campaigns C1, C2, C4, C5, C7 and C8 are not fully
delivered: for these campaigns, the penalty in case of under-delivery
is low compared to the opportunity cost incurred by the publisher
by not selling impressions on the RTB market. Also, the campaigns
targeting clicks are mainly delivered on placement P3, which has
a significantly higher click probability whereas the RTB bid is not
significantly higher than on the other placements.
6.3 Second experiment: optimization with
many campaigns
We note in this sectionU (a,b) the uniform distribution on [a,b]. In
this experiment, we run the optimization with K campaigns, and
each campaign is generated the following way:
Figure 2: Second experiment: average adjusted revenue as a
function of the number of batches processed
• It targets all impressions where h(imp_id) ≡ 1 mod M ,
where h is a hash function, imp_id is the id of the impression,
andM is drawn from U (10, 100). This methodology ensures
that the targetings of a pair of campaigns has most of the
time a non-empty intersection (which makes probably the
optimization harder, as each impression must be allocated
efficiently among all the campaigns targeting it)
• The impression goal Nimp is drawn from the distribution
U (0,N ), where N is chosen such that the sum of the goals on
all campaigns represent in average 40% of the total number
of impressions available. Consequently, N decreases when
K increases. Note that in this experiment, we do not define
any goals on the number of impressions clicked or viewed
• The penalty parameter limp associated to the impressions
goal is drawn from the distributionU (0, 50)
Figure 2 plots the adjusted revenue of the publisher on the whole
dataset as a function of the number of batches processed by the opti-
mization algorithm, for different values of the number of campaigns
K .
We see on the figure that increasing the number of campaigns
does not slow the convergence of the algorithm, and a few dozens
of batches are enough to converge to the optimum. In practice, the
optimum is attained in less than a fewminutes with 1000 campaigns.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we study the problem of optimizing the revenue a web
publisher gets through RTB and Direct. For each impression, the
publisher bids in the RTB auction and chooses the direct campaign
to deliver should it win the auction. We have been able to define
an algorithm to determine an optimal strategy for the publisher in
this setting.
The experiments performed on a RTB auctions dataset show that
the algorithm scales with the number of campaigns, as increasing
the number of campaigns does not slow the convergence. With 1000
campaigns, an optimal strategy can be estimated in a few minutes.
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Also, applying the optimal strategy is particularly simple and
the most computationally intensive part is to compute the score of
each campaign, which is a weighted sum of the predictors θn,k,i . In
practice, the publisher has a few milliseconds to determine its bid.
Should the number of campaigns be too high to be able to compute
all the scores, the publisher should define a strategy to sample the
campaigns considered for a given impression.
In practice, a web publisher should estimate the optimal strategy
on a long period of time (ideally on several months) to make it as
stable as possible. Applying it in the future relies on the hypothesis
that the future RTB market is similar to the past auctions used in
the estimation, in terms of volume and bid level. The estimation can
also be adjusted to reflect an expected change in the RTB market.
When the RTB market characteristics differ too much from the
dataset used in the estimation, the publisher should define amethod-
ology to adjust the strategy. Such a methodology can be based for
example on a controller which updates the strategy from time to
time. This is a different topic which has been studied specifically in
the literature (see [9], [8]).
The algorithm presented in the paper combined with a controller
form a system which is being developed to be deployed on thou-
sands of publishers worldwide.
Finally, the hypothesis that the set of campaigns is known when
estimating the strategy is well suited to the theoretical analysis of
the problem and to the derivation of an estimation algorithm. In
practice, the publisher should make hypotheses on the campaigns
which will be agreed in the future.
8 APPENDIX
8.1 Derivation of the optimality conditions
The lagrangian of the problem writes:
L((an ), (qn,k ), (vk,i )) =
N∑
n=1
rn (an )+
K∑
k=1
(
πk − Lk (vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,vk,pk − дk,pk )
)
−
K∑
k=1
pk∑
i=1
λk,i (vk,i −
N∑
n=1
Fn (an )qn,kθn,k,i )
−
N∑
n=1
µn (
K∑
k=1
qn,k − 1) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
ηn,kqn,k
(7)
where λk,i , µn and ηn,k are the lagrange multipliers correspond-
ing to the constraints.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions are:
∀n, ∂L
∂an
= r ′n (an ) + fn (an )
K∑
k=1
qn,k (
pk∑
i=1
λk,iθn,k,i ) = 0
∀n,k, ∂L
∂qn,k
= Fn (an )
pk∑
i=1
λk,iθn,k,i − µn + ηn,k = 0
∀k, i, ∂L
∂vk,i
= − ∂Lk
∂vk,i
(vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,vk,pk − дk,pk ) − λk,i = 0
(8)
8.1.1 Conditions on qn,k . From the second equation we get for
auction n:
∀k, Fn (an )
pk∑
i=1
λk,iθn,k,i = µn − ηn,k
Let’s consider the setMn of k-s maximizing
∑pk
i=1 λk,iθn,k,i :
Mn = argmax
k
pk∑
i=1
λk,iθn,k,i
If Fn (an ) > 0, we get:
Mn = argmax
k
(µn − ηn,k )
As ηn,k is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the con-
straint qn,k ≥ 0, we have ∀k,min(ηn,k ,qn,k ) = 0. We know also
that there must be at least one k such that ηn,k = 0 (otherwise all
qn,k would be equal to 0 and they couldn’t sum to 1).
We deduce that maxk (µn − ηn,k ) = µn , and finally: if k ∈ Mn ,
ηn,k = 0 (and qn,k > 0), otherwise ηn,k > 0 (and qn,k = 0).
We introduce the score of campaign Ck in auction n, defined by:
cn,k = −
pk∑
i=1
θn,k,i
∂Lk
∂vk,i
(vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,vk,pk − дk,pk )
We obtain the following optimality condition:
qn,k > 0⇒ k ∈ argmax
k
cn,k
8.1.2 Conditions on an . The first equation gives the optimality
condition on an :
r ′n (an ) + fn (an )max
k
cn,k = 0
8.2 Particular case where some penalty
functions are rectified linear functions
We assume in this section that the penalty function for campaign
Ck writes Lk (vk,1, . . . ,vk,pk ) =
∑pk
i=1 li max(дk,i − vk,i , 0). This
kind of penalty function is widely used in practice but is not differ-
entiable.
Let ∂Lvk,i be the sub-gradient of the lagrangian L with respect
to vk,i , which writes:
∂Lvk,i =

{−li − λk,i } if vk,i < дk,i
[−li − λk,i ,−λk,i ] if vk,i = дk,i
{−λk,i } if vk,i > дk,i
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition with respect to
vk,i writes: 0 ∈ ∂Lvk,i . This gives similar optimality conditions
where the score of campaign Ck is written the following way:
cn,k =
pk∑
i=1
θn,k,iκk,i with

κk,i = li if vk,i < дk,i
κk,i ∈ [0, li ] if vk,i = дk,i
κk,i = 0 if vk,i > дk,i
8.3 Analysis of the optimality condition on a
In this section, we note Fb and Fc the cumulative probability func-
tions of the highest bid B and the second highest bid C , and fb
and fc their probability density functions. We assume that these
functions are continuous on [0,+∞[ and that ∀a, fb (a) > 0.
KDD ’18, August 19–23, 2018, London, United Kingdom G. Jauvion and N. Grislain
The optimality condition on a states that the optimal value ver-
ifies r ′fb (a) = −c , where c ≥ 0 is the maximum score of the direct
campaigns.
We show in this section that in a second-price auction mecha-
nism, this optimality condition has at least one solution under a
usual hypothesis on the distributions B and C . The solution is very
simple in a first-price auction mechanism.
8.3.1 Second-price auction mechanism. We have:
r (a) = E[1a≤Bmax(a,C)] = E[1a≤C C] + E[1C≤a≤B a]
Note that E[1C≤a≤B ] = P(a ≤ B) − P(a ≤ C) = Fc (a) − Fb (a),
because C ≤ B.
Then:
r ′(a) = Fc (a) − Fb (a) + a(fc (a) − fb (a)) − afc (a)
= −afb (a) + (Fc (a) − Fb (a))
And:
r ′
fb
(a) = −a + Fc (a) − Fb (a)
fb (a)
It is worth noting that this function depends on the marginal dis-
tributions B andC only. It does not depend on the joint distribution
(B,C), which makes the analysis much simpler.
It is easy to see that r ′fb (0) = 0 (as Fb (0) = Fc (0) = 0). To analyze
the behaviour of this function when a → +∞, we write the function
r ′
fb
using the hazard rates of B and C , hb =
fb
1−Fb and hc =
fc
1−Fc :
r ′
fb
(a) = −a + 1
hb (a)
− 1
hc (a)
fc (a)
fb (a)
≤ −a + 1
hb (a)
We assume also that 1hb (a) = o(a). This hypothesis is quite usual
and is verified by the normal and the log-normal distributions.
Therefore, we have:
lim
a→+∞
r ′
fb
(a) = −∞
As r ′fb is a continuous function on [0,+∞[, we conclude that
under the hypothesis 1hb (a) = o(a),
r ′
fb
is a surjective function to
[0,−∞[. This means that the optimality condition r ′fb (a) = −c has at
least one solution for every c ≥ 0. However, we have no guarantee
on the unicity of the solution.
8.3.2 First-price auction mechanism. The first-price auction can
be modeled with C = B, and in this case we have r ′fb (a) = −a. The
optimality condition has one unique solution a = c .
8.4 A regularization of the optimization
problem
We introduce in this section a regularization of the optimization
problem which makes the optimality conditions more stable. For
each auction n, we add the term ρH (Qn ) to the objective function,
where ρ is the regularization parameter which does not depend
on n and H (Qn ) is the entropy of the distribution Qn . The case
ρ → 0 corresponds to the non regularized optimization problem,
and in the case ρ → +∞, the optimalQn distribution is the uniform
distribution.
The objective function of the problem becomes:
yr eдular ized
(
(an )Nn=1, (qn,1, . . . ,qn,K )Nn=1, ρ
)
=
N∑
n=1
rn (an ) +
K∑
k=1
(
πk − Lk (vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,vk,pk − дk,pk )
)
−ρ
N∑
n=1
( K∑
k=1
qn,k ln(qn,k )
) (9)
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions write:
∀n, ∂L
∂an
= r ′n (an ) + fn (an )
K∑
k=1
qn,kcn,k = 0
∀n,k, ∂L
∂qn,k
= Fn (an )cn,k − µn − ρ(1 + ln(qn,k )) = 0
∀i,k, ∂L
∂vk,i
= − ∂Lk
∂vk,i
(vk,1 − дk,1, . . . ,vk,pk − дk,pk ) − λk,i = 0
(10)
The second equation gives:
qn,k = e
−(1+ µnρ )ecn,k
Fn (an )
ρ
And the constraint
∑K
k=1 qn,k = 1 gives:
qn,k =
exp(cn,k Fn (an )ρ )∑K
k ′=1 exp(cn,k ′
Fn (an )
ρ )
Finally, the optimality conditions of the problem are the follow-
ing:
• The qn,k define a Boltzmann distribution with the weights
ecn,k and a temperature ρFn (an )
• an verifies r ′n (an ) + fn (an )
∑K
k=1 qn,kcn,k = 0
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